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Rhode Island's Distribution of Powers
Question of the Century: Reverse
Delegation and Implied Limits on
Legislative Powers*
Robert F. Williams**
At the revolution . [t]he executive and the judicial as
well as the legislative authority was now the child of the peo-
ple; but, to the two former, the people behaved like stepmoth-
ers. The legislature was still discriminated by excessive
* This is an expanded version of a presentation given at Roger Williams
University School of Law on April 25, 1998. The faculty at Roger Williams
University School of Law and the editors of the Law Review must be commended
for taking on this important and timely, albeit controversial, topic. After all, as
Professor Richard Kay of the University of Connecticut School of Law has
observed:
The transformation of a law school from an institution of vocational
competence into one of intellectual excellence is often associated with an
increased attention to legal subjects that are national in scope ....
It is also true, however, that this broadening of interest need not be
accompanied by an abandonment of a special concern for the legal issues
and problems that are peculiar to a law school's home.
Richard S. Kay, The Jurisprudence of the Connecticut Constitution, 16 Conn. L.
Rev. 667, 667 (1984).
Chief Justice Joseph Weisberger of the Rhode Island Supreme Court has also
pointed out:
The mission of a law school is not just to educate persons who wish to
become members of the bar, but also to contribute to and enhance the
legal culture of every jurisdiction which the law school touches. One of
the primary tools in producing this contribution is the law review pub-
lished by the law school. The law review is a think tank which contributes
original thought as well as a synthesis and presentation of the thoughts
embodied in the appellate opinions which they analyze. Probably this
contribution is as great in the performance of the educational mission as
is the training of law school students who aspire to membership in the
bar.
Rhode Island is fortunate at long last to have a law school and even
more fortunate to have a law school that is about to embark upon the
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partiality; and into its lap, every good and precious gift was
profusely thrown.
James Wilson'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known to almost everyone that the early state consti-
tutions, although often textually recognizing the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers, in fact "tended to exalt legislative power at the
expense of the executive and the judiciary."2 James Wilson's re-
marks quoted above reflect this experience. James Madison ob-
publication of what will undoubtedly become a highly respected law
review.
Honorable Joseph R. Weisberger, Foreword, 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. vii, ix
(1996).
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Cam-
den. I appreciate being invited to participate in this Symposium, made up essen-
tially of Amici Curiae, providing out-of-state perspectives on Rhode Island's
momentous distribution of powers issue. This invitation was, most likely, based on
my academic work with state constitutions. I have, however, also traveled this
same road as a practicing lawyer. In 1991, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted
legislation addressing the fiscal crisis in the city of Philadelphia. See Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 53, §§ 12720.101-.709 (West Supp. 1998) (effective June 5, 1991). The
statute created an appointed board to oversee the city's finances, with four of the
five voting members appointed by, and serving at the pleasure of, members of the
Legislature. See id. § 12720.202(a). I was retained by the city's public employee
unions to challenge the statute. We initiated a quo warranto action directly in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on separation of powers, as well as other, unrelated
grounds. The legislation required any challenge to the act to be brought directly in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id. § 12720.702. After four of the seven
justices recused themselves, the remaining three held that my clients, the city un-
ions, lacked standing to challenge the makeup of the board on separation of powers
grounds. See Local 22, Philadelphia Fire Fighters' Union v. Commonwealth, 613
A.2d 522, 526 (Pa. 1992):
In the present case... the unions have not demonstrated how their
interests are affected by the allegedly unconstitutional means by which
PICA Board members are appointed. The first claim must be denied,
therefore, for the unions have no standing to bring a quo warranto action
challenging the manner in which the PICA Board is appointed.
Consequently, this very important issue remains unresolved in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court avoided deciding the issue, as has the Rhode
Island Supreme Court until now.
1. 1 The Works of James Wilson 292-93 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
2. William Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 21
(Milton R. Konvitz ed., 1972); see also Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of
Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 216-19
(1989) (stating that, although states introduced separation of powers clauses into
their constitutions, in reality, the legislature continued to overshadow the execu-
tive branch).
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served in the Constitutional Convention that "[eixperience had
proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the
Legislative vortex."3 If Madison had been speaking today, he
would probably have asserted that the legislative branch expanded
its influence like the gravitational pull of a "black hole." These ob-
servations, based on actual experience under the state constitu-
tions of the Revolutionary period, led to the almost unanimous
conclusion of contemporaries that state legislatures were "omnipo-
tent."4 Wilson's experience had been under the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1776.5 Thomas Jefferson's experience, as Madison's,
was with the Virginia Constitution of 1776, and he was equally
critical of legislative dominance. 6
I. ORIGIN OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
When the federal Constitution was adopted, it built on the les-
sons of legislative dominance learned during the Revolutionary
years. 7 Thereafter, though, the state constitutions continued on a
process of evolution separate from federal constitutional theory.8
This process followed the experimental model of federalism that
had begun in the decade prior to the adoption of the federal Consti-
tution. In that decade, the states, in the words of Jackson Turner
Main, "became the laboratories for testing theories, trying the in-
stitutions in the various forms that presently appeared in the con-
stitutions of the United States and other countries."9
3. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 35 (Max Farrand ed.,
2d ed. 1937); see also The Federalist No. 48, at 322 (James Madison) (Sherman F.
Mitchell ed., 1937) (cautioning against legislative encroachment).
4. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 3, at 35.
Madison stated in the Convention: "The Executives of the States are in general
little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent." Id.
5. See Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade:
Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and its Influences on American Constitu-
tionalism, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 541, 574-75 (1989).
6. See David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson 53-
88 (1994).
7. See Williams, supra note 5, at 574-80.
8. See James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional
Tradition, 22 Rutgers L.J. 819, 821-26 (1991).
9. Jackson Turner Main, The American States in the Revolutionary Era, in
Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty 1, 23 (Ronald Hofman & Peter J. Albert
eds., 1981).
Justice Brandeis's better-known description of the states as "laboratories" was
made in reference to state legislative innovations at the beginning of the twentieth
1998]
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Contemporaries of this period understood the experimental nature
of those efforts at constitution-making. In 1778, for example,
Thomas Paine applauded "the happy opportunity of trying variety
in order to discover the best .... By diversifying the several con-
stitutions, we shall see which State flourish the best, and out of the
many posterity may choose a model ...."10
Also, during this early period, there came a fundamental shift
in conception of the executive branch, particularly the Governor.
As Gordon S. Wood has observed,
[Tihe Americans went far beyond anything the English had
attempted with Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights. They
aimed to make the gubernatorial magistrate a new kind of
creature, a very pale reflection indeed of its regal ancestor.
They wanted effectively to eliminate the magistracy's chief
responsibility for ruling the society-a remarkable and ab-
rupt departure from the English constitutional tradition ....
The powers and prerogatives taken from the Governors
were given to the legislatures, marking a revolutionary shift
in the traditional responsibility of government. 1
Therefore, at the same time the revolutionary state constitutions
were providing legislative dominance, they were reformulating the
century. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (discussing "social experiments ... in the insulated chambers afforded by
the several States").
10. Thomas Paine, A Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the
Present Situation of Their Affairs, in Pennsylvania Packet (Dec. 1, 1778), reprinted
in 2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 277, 281 (Philip S. Foner Ph.D. ed.,
1945).
The author of the 1776 pamphlet, Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, re-
cently said to be Thomas Paine, argued:
Perhaps most of the Colonies will have two houses, and it will probably be
of benefit to have some little difference in the forms of government, as
those which do not like one, may reside in another, and by trying different
experiments, the best form will the sooner be found out, as the preference
at present rests on conjecture.
Four Letters on Interesting Subjects (Philadelphia, 1776), reprinted in 1 American
Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760-1805, at 368, 387 (Charles S.
Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983); see also David F. Hawke, In the Midst of a
Revolution 196-97 (1961) (quoting contemporary Thomas Smith as writing rather
bitterly about the 1776 Pennsylvania constitutional convention: "You know that
experimental philosophy was in great repute fifty years ago, and we have a mind to
try how the same principles will succeed in politics!").
11. Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American
Revolution, 24 Rutgers L.J. 911, 915, 916 (1993).
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governor's position from a policy-making to a policy-implementing
role.
Bringing the other two branches to some form of parity, or at
least bringing them closer to being "co-equal" with the legislature
would continue to occupy state constitutional framers for at least
the next century.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH: IMPLIED LIMITS
More so than either the executive or judicial branches, the leg-
islative branch is different at the state level from the Congress at
the federal level. State legislative power is plenary, whereas fed-
eral legislative power is enumerated. 12 This basic distinction is
somewhat oversimplified because state constitutions also do con-
tain authorizations for the legislature to act. Still, however, it is
this basic distinction that led to the observation that the most im-
portant questions of judicial interpretation of the federal Constitu-
tion have to do with implied powers, while at the state level
implied limitations are most important. 13
A. The Nontextual Boundaries of Legislative Power
In resolving this matter which confronts the State of Rhode
Island, it is important to focus on what is meant by "legislative"
power 14 and "executive" power.' 5 These are both terms of art used
in the Rhode Island Constitution but not in the former Charter.
Focus on the meaning of "legislative power" is still necessary even
where broad, plenary state legislative power is recognized, as by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court:
The State Constitution defines the powers granted to the ex-
ecutive and judicial departments of government, leaving all
other powers to the legislative branch, unless prohibited to it
12. See Walter F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitu-
tional Law, 29 Yale L.J. 137, 137-38 (1919).
13. See id. at 160; see also Michael J. Besso, Connecticut Legislative Power in
the First Century of State Constitutional Government, 15 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1, 15
(1995) (discussing the search for grants of legislative power within the U.S. Consti-
tution, as opposed to the search for limitations on legislative power within state
constitutions).
14. For a discussion of legislative power, see Robert F. Williams, Comment:
On the Importance of a Theory of Legislative Power Under State Constitutions, 15
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 57 (1995).
15. See R.I. Const. art. VI, § 2 (legislative); id. art. IX, § 1 (executive).
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by the constitution .... Because the General Assembly does
not look to the State Constitution for grants of power, we
have invariably adhered to the view that the General Assem-
bly possesses all the powers inherent to the sovereign other
than those that the constitution textually commits to the
other branches of state government.' 6
The legislative power is, itself, conceptually limited to the notion of
"legislating." Concepts such as "legislative" and "executive" power
are, of course, indeterminate.' 7 They can be words of limitation as
well as words granting power. There are unwritten limitations, or
internal constraints, on this plenary power, such as the "public
purpose" doctrine.' 8 This implied limitation on legislative power
was clearly recognized as early as 1853 in Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia,19 where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted:
Neither has the legislature any constitutional right to
create a public debt, or to lay a tax, or to authorize any mu-
nicipal corporation to do it, in order to raise funds for a mere
private purpose. No such authority passed to the Assembly by
the general grant of legislative power. This would not be leg-
islation. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public
purposes.20
In certain situations limitations on legislative power are im-
plied, and arise from the legal concept of legislative power. Where
does legislating end and executing or administering begin? Many
years ago Walter Dodd confronted the question of the concept of
"legislative power":
The view is frequently expressed that state legislatures have
inherently all power not denied to them by state and national
constitutions. This view is based upon the notion that state
legislatures inherited the powers of the British parliament
and possess such powers in full unless denied
The result is very nearly the same whether we say (1)
that the state constitution confers "legislative powers," and
that this means all power not denied by constitutional texts,
16. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I. 1995) (citations
omitted).
17. See William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in
the Age of the Framers, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 263 (1989).
18. Besso, supra note 13, at 14 n.56.
19. 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
20. Id. at 168-69 (partial emphasis in original).
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or (2) that "legislative power" is inherent, and unlimited ex-
cept as restricted by constitutional texts. The first statement
is perhaps the better, for there is little ground in our history
since the Revolution for inherent or original powers in any
department of government. In fact, when reference is made
to inherent power, what has usually been meant is that "leg-
islative power," granted in general terms, must be inter-
preted as conferring all governmental power, except so far as
restricted by constitutional texts, i.e., that all such power in-
heres in the general grant.21
First, the "public purpose" doctrine has current importance,
for example, in such areas as legislation authorizing vouchers for
private school education 22 and authorizing the government to pur-
sue child support obligations on behalf of nonindigent persons. 23
Another way of thinking about the limitation of legislative power
to pubic purposes is to analyze the legislature's "police power."24
This limitation is also not expressly contained in state constitu-
tions, but is viewed as an inherent limiting concept within the no-
tion of "legislative power."
Second, the issue of legislators, and, to a lesser extent their
designees, serving on executive boards and commissions can also
be seen as a matter of dual office-holding as a subcategory of sepa-
ration of powers concern. Dual office-holding, or "incompatibility,"
was a major concern of the framers of the first state constitu-
tions.25 Recent commentators concluded:
It is important to note that broad bans on plural office
holding of the type found in the North Carolina, Maryland,
and New Jersey Constitutions were conceived first and fore-
most as anti-corruption measures. Surprisingly, the separa-
tion-of-powers aspect of incompatibility seems not to have
been the major theme.26
21. W. F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 Pol. Sci. Q. 201, 201,
205 (1915).
22. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474-77 (Wis. 1992).
23. See In re Marriage of Lappe, 680 N.E.2d 380, 388-92 (Ill. 1997).
24. Besso, supra note 13, at 13 n.54. In 1969 the Illinois Supreme Court de-
clared a motorcycle crash-helmet law unconstitutional as outside the legislature's
police power. See People v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d. 149, 151 (Inl. 1969).
25. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separa-
tion of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1057-61 (1994).
26. Id. at 1060; see also M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of
Powers 134 (1967) (noting the separation of powers doctrine was originally used to
prohibit dual office-holding).
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Rhode Island's constitution does not contain a specific ban on dual
state office-holding, 27 but the concept can be viewed as within sepa-
ration of powers concerns in the area of personnel.
A third implied limitation on an otherwise plenary state legis-
lative power is the rule that a present legislature cannot bind fu-
ture legislatures. The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently
confronted this issue and, after surveying the doctrine in other ju-
risdictions, concluded: "[the proposition that one legislature can-
not bind a succeeding legislature is derived from the constitutional
power of the Legislature to legislate."28 This is an implied restric-
tion, or limit, on legislative power arising from the very concept of
what it means to legislate.
This way of looking at implied limits on state legislative power
is, to some extent, conceptual or formalistic. It draws on the idea
that one can define the concept of "legislative power." As one
scholar has explained, "[tihe formalist approach is committed to
strong substantive separations between the branches of govern-
ment, finding support in the traditional expositions of the theme of
'pure' separated powers, such as the maxim that 'the legislature
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
law.'" 29 Formalism in this regard has been criticized as yielding
mechanical outcomes, but providing the benefit of bright-line
rules.30
The alternative to the formalist approach is a functionalist
analysis:
In contrast, advocates of the "functionalist" approach
urge the Court to ask a different question: whether an action
of one branch interferes with one of the core functions of an-
other .... The functionalist view follows a different strand of
separation-of-powers tradition from that of the formalists: the
27. See R.I. Const. art. III, § 6 (prohibiting dual federal and state office-
holding).
28. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 544 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Neb. 1996).
29. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1513, 1523-24 (1991) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46
(1825)).
30. See id. at 1524-26. Sheldon Whitehouse points out that the federal
"bright-line" rule prohibits legislators and their appointees from serving on in-
dependent or executive agencies. See Sheldon Whitehouse, Appointments by the
Legislature Under the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of
the Road Less Traveled, 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1996).
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American variant that stresses not the independence, but the
interdependence of the branches. 31
The functionalist approach permits much more judicial discretion
than the formalist approach.32
The point of all these examples-public purpose, dual office-
holding and binding future legislatures-is not that they have di-
rect bearing on the question before the Rhode Island Supreme
Court now, but rather that they illustrate the range of limits on
otherwise plenary state legislative power that are implied from the
very concept of legislating. Separation of powers is similar,33
although it has a textual basis in Rhode Island, and it does have a
direct bearing on the current issue.
B. The Rhode Island Situation
The stage is now set in Rhode Island, over two centuries after
the legislative dominance of the Founding period, for a definitive
advisory opinion concerning the propriety of legislators and legisla-
tive appointees serving on executive branch, or administrative,
boards and commissions. 34 This is an important "recurrence to
fundamental principles."3 5 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
has, in the past, approached this question but failed to resolve it.36
31. Brown, supra note 29, at 1527-28.
32. See id. at 1528.
33. The separation of powers doctrine operates as a limit on the legislative
branch, as it also limits the other branches. As one commentator has noted, "[ilt is
axiomatic that the authority of the state legislature is plenary except as limited by
the state constitution and federal law. Separation of powers is one of those limita-
tions." Roy Pulvers, Separation of Powers Under the Oregon Constitution: A User's
Guide, 75 Or. L. Rev. 443, 449 (1996) (citing Brusco Towboat Co. v. State Land Bd.,
589 P.2d 712, 717 (Or. 1978) and Ryan v. Harris, 2 Or. 175, 176 (1866) for the
proposition that state legislative authority is limited by its constitution and federal
laws. Pulvers also cites State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 407 P.2d 250, 254-
55 (Or. 1966) for the proposition that separation of powers is a limitation on legis-
lative power). See id.
34. See generally Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Pro-
cess in Rhode Island, 2 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 207 (1997) (discussing Rhode
Island's advisory opinion process).
35. Va. Const. art. I, § 15.
36. See, e.g., In re Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 670 A.2d
1232, 1234 (R.I. 1996) (holding that the presumption of constitutionality prevails
where the court was evenly divided over whether the presence of members from
the legislature on the commission violated the separation of powers principle);
Easton's Point Ass'n v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 522 A.2d 199,
201-02 (R.I. 1987) (declining to rule on whether the legislature's appointment of
1998]
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The matter has been treated in academic literature before.3 7 How-
ever, the issue must be decided within Rhode Island's interesting
and unique state constitutional context. 3s
Resolving the questions presented will require the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court to confront, in the words of former Oregon
Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, the tension "between fidelity
to the state's own charter" and the sense that constitutional law is
a shared enterprise.3 9 Is the question one for a state-specific form
of positivism, or rather one calling for a more generalized, or uni-
versalist, American-constitutional separation of powers doctrine?40
Should the Rhode Island Supreme Court follow federal constitu-
tional separation of powers doctrine?41 Professor John Devlin has
argued that following federal doctrine in this area of separation of
powers is no more required than in other areas:
The thesis of this article is that there are systematic dif-
ferences between the federal government and the states with
respect to their constitutions and their place in the American
scheme of government. These differences make the develop-
eight of the seventeen members of the Coastal Resources Management Council
violated separation of powers).
37. See generally Whitehouse, supra note 30 (discussing Rhode Island's reluc-
tance to acknowledge the dangers of legislative encroachment); Sheldon White-
house, The Impetuous Vortex, 43 R.I. B.J. 7 (1995) (arguing that the legislature has
almost unchecked appointment power).
38. For a discussion of Rhode Island's constitutional history, see Patrick T.
Conley, Democracy in Decline: Rhode Island's Constitutional Development, 1776-
1841 (1977); Kevin D. Leitao, Rhode Island's Forgotten Bill of Rights, 1 Roger Wil-
liams U. L. Rev. 31 (1996).
39. Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 Ariz. L. Rev.
215, 216 (1992); see also Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and
State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 196 (1984):
Constitutional text is important not for what a court must decide but
for what it cannot plausibly decide. Text can confine a judicial interpreta-
tion when it cannot compel one. Judicial review can be not only interpre-
tive or noninterpretive but misinterpretive. A long buried grub surpris-
ingly metamorphoses into a butterfly and remains the same insect, and an
underwater tadpole turns into an airbreathing frog; but some decisions
have made butterflies grow from tadpoles, to the applause of theorists
who prefer butterflies. There are limits to what can be explained as con-
stitutional law before turning it into genetic engineering.
40. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn't: Constitu-
tional Universalism in the States, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 109 (1998).
41. See generally Whitehouse, supra note 30, at 14-17 (advocating that Rhode
Island follow federal separation of powers doctrine).
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ment of an independent theory of state constitutional alloca-
tion of governmental powers both possible and desirable. 4 2
However, on at least one occasion, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has turned to federal separation of powers doctrine in the
absence of Rhode Island precedent:
Although no authority bearing directly on this issue has been
called to our attention, complainant comments in her brief
that the relevant provisions of our constitution have the same
meaning as the comparable provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution, and she suggests that "federal cases dealing with ex-
ecutive power establish standards by which to measure the
power of the Governor to issue executive orders on Fair Em-
ployment Practices."
That suggestion commends itself to us .... 43
Looking specifically at the Rhode Island Constitution, it is
clear that Article V, by contrast to the federal Constitution, pro-
vides an express, textual affirmation of the doctrine of separation
of powers.4 4 Interestingly, state courts have split on the question
of whether such an express separation of powers statement
mandates a more strict judicial separation of powers doctrine,
possibly illustrating Professor Gardner's positivistluniversalist
dichotomy. 45
42. See John Devlin, Toward A State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Func-
tions, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1205, 1211 (1993); see also Hon. Ellen A. Peters, Getting
Away From the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn.
L. Rev. 1543, 1554-62 (1997) (discussing the effects of separation of powers in state
courts as compared to federal courts).
43. Chang v. University of R.I., 375 A.2d 925, 928 (R.I. 1977); see also
Whitehouse, supra note 30, at 16 n.80 (referring to other cases where the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has looked to the federal Constitution for guidance).
44. "The powers of the government shall be distributed into three depart-
ments: the legislative, executive and judicial." R.I. Const. art. V. The three
branches are also explicitly recognized in the paragraph introducing the Rhode
Island Declaration of Rights. See R.I. Const. art. I.
45. See Gardner, supra note 40. Compare Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,
372 So. 2d 913, 924-25 (Fla. 1978) (applying a strict interpretation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, which would prohibit the delegation of legislative powers.
This is an example of the positivist theory), with Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572,
576-77 (N.J. 1972) (upholding a delegation which authorized the governor to pre-
pare a reorganization plan for the Department of Labor and Industry. This is an
example of the universalist theory). See generally Robert W. Martin, Jr., Legisla-
tive Delegations of Power and Judicial Review-Preventing Judicial Impotence, 8
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 43 (1980) (discussing the relationship between separation of
powers principles and the delegation of legislative power).
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It is possible to see Rhode Island's current constitution as still
suffering from the key constitutional problem of the founding dec-
ade-namely, the emerging relationship of separation of powers
rhetoric and concrete checks and balances mechanisms. The Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1776 lacked checks and balances. Vile
makes this point as follows:
It is often stated that the Constitution of Pennsylvania did
not embody the separation of powers, whereas in fact it was
the basis of the whole Constitution. It is the failure to distin-
guish clearly between the separation of powers on the one
hand, and checks and balances on the other, which leads to
the confusion. The founders of the 1776 Constitution were
bitterly opposed to any semblance of the checks and balances
of the monarchic or aristocratic constitution. 46
The period of state experiments with legislative appointments
to executive agencies has just about been completed. The weight of
authority, of course, both under federal and other states' separa-
tion of powers doctrines, is that legislators and legislative appoin-
tees may not serve on executive or administrative boards and
commissions. 47 One in-depth academic commentary concluded:
It is generally recognized that the power to appoint Exec-
utive Officers is inherently executive, and that to hold other-
wise is to deprive the Chief Executive of the right to control
his own branch of government. The Governor's obligation to
faithfully execute the law implies, as a necessary incident,
the power to appoint those who will act under his direction in
discharging this obligation. 48
46. Vile, supra note 26, at 136.
47. See generally Devlin, supra note 42, at 1242-50 (discussing the different
approaches that various states have taken with respect to legislative appoint-
ments); Sheryl G. Snyder & Robert M. Ireland, The Separation of Governmental
Powers Under the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of
L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 Ky. L.J. 165, 210-16 (1984-85) (discussing the Kentucky
Supreme Court's decision in L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984), which
held the power of appointment is an executive function); Whitehouse, supra note
30, at 25-28 (referring to other states that have addressed the separation of powers
issue and ruled that legislative appointments offend the separation of powers
principle).
48. Snyder & Ireland, supra note 47, at 210-11 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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Weight of authority, though, is not controlling on this Rhode
Island constitutional question. The advice provided by Chief Jus-
tice Randall Shepard of Indiana, is relevant here:
Fifty state supreme courts have examined the questions
about which my colleagues write today and forty-nine of them
have reached the opposite conclusion. The fact that Indiana
stands alone on this issue does not mean that we are wrong,
but it certainly does not prove we are right. Instead, I think
it suggests that this might be a moment to heed the advice we
often give to juries: "Re-examine your own views in light of
the opinions of others."49
III. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
If the dispute currently coming to a head in Rhode Island is
between the legislature and the executive, what stake is there for
the judiciary? Paul Verkuil posed the question in the federal con-
text: "The debate typically arises over congressional and executive
initiatives in government administration, but the judicial branch
has a fundamental stake in the outcome. The question for the judi-
ciary is how closely should it umpire the activities of the poli-
cymaking branches."50
As important as the "protection" of one branch from another is,
in this case the executive from the legislature, the underlying goal
of judicial enforcement of separation of powers principles is the lib-
erty of the citizens. The judicial role in separation of powers cases,
particularly those involving encroachment, "ought to be as vigilant
arbiter of process for the purpose of protecting individuals from the
dangers of arbitrary government." 51 When legislators pass laws,
including appropriations, and then administer those laws and
funding with questionable legislative oversight, there is the poten-
tial and even the probable reality of arbitrary government.
The problem currently before the Rhode Island Supreme Court
involves an example of attempted encroachment by one branch
into the affairs of another, rather than the problem that arises
49. In re Indiana State Bar Ass'n, 550 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Ind. 1990) (Shepard,
CJ., dissenting).
50. Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 301, 302 (1989).
51. Brown, supra note 29, at 1565; see Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and
Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
79 (1998).
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when one branch seeks to abdicate authority to another branch.
Encroachment is the more disturbing of the two types of problems,
and is closer to the "vortex" phenomenon observed in action during
the Revolutionary period. The New Jersey Supreme Court has re-
cently stated that encroachment problems require much greater
judicial scrutiny than do abdication problems.52 Appointment by
the legislature of its own members or its designees to executive
boards constitutes a sort of "reverse delegation"-an encroachment
that should be subjected to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny.53
If, in fact, legislative appointment of its members or appoin-
tees to administrative or executive boards constitutes a form of
"reverse delegation," what light is shed on the problem by examin-
ing the nondelegation doctrine itself? First, reverse delegation is a
form of legislative encroachment on the executive, where delega-
tion constitutes, rather, a ceding of authority. It can be argued
persuasively that reverse delegation, therefore, should receive
more rigorous judicial scrutiny than delegation. A commentator
who recently surveyed the state courts' approaches to the delega-
tion doctrine concluded that Rhode Island exemplified a "'loose'
standards and safeguards" approach. 54 Citing Bourque v. Det-
tore,55 this commentator placed Rhode Island in his "Category II,"
Category II states allow delegations of lawmaking power
to administrative agencies as long as the statute contains a
general rule to guide the agency in exercising the delegated
power. Guiding rules may take the form of general stan-
dards, procedural safeguards, or a combination of the two
.... This standard embodies the principle that in modern
society, Congress and state legislatures address complex
problems in industry, economics, and general public health
and safety. Because Congress often is unable or unwilling to
52. See Communication Workers v. Florio, 617 A.2d 223, 232 (N.J. 1992)
("Although both the giving and taking of power can be constitutional if not exces-
sive, the taking of power is more prone to abuse and therefore warrants an espe-
cially careful scrutiny.").
53. Id.
54. Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doc-
trine in the States, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 567, 588-91 & n.109 (1994) ("Essentially,
in Rhode Island, a delegation is valid if the statute provides for either standards or
procedures to confine and guide the agency's discretion." (citing Bourque v. Det-
tore, 589 A.2d 815, 818 (R.I. 1991)). See generally Arthur Earl Bonfield & Michael
Asimov, State and Federal Administrative Law 451-61 (1989) (describing the state
nondelegation doctrine).
55. 589 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1991).
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deal with these problems, it frequently relies on administra-
tive experts to decide upon the details of such legislation.
Consequently, many courts have allowed delegations of broad
power to administrative agencies with minimal direction
from the legislature.5 6
The nondelegation doctrine is based on separation of powers
concerns, underlying which are desires to shield citizens from arbi-
trary government. In a state like Rhode Island, therefore, which
arguably has a relatively loose view of the dangers of broad delega-
tions of legislative power to the executive, there is even more rea-
son for concern when the legislature goes on to administer
statutes, including appropriations, through its own members or
their appointees. Arbitrary government is bound to result from
broad delegations of authority,57 joined with reverse delegations of
personnel. This is a bad combination.
Bourque v. Dettore is certainly not the only delegation doctrine
case in Rhode Island, but a full investigation of this doctrine is be-
yond the scope of this article. Bourque, even though it might be
categorized as "soft" on delegation, expresses the separation of
powers concerns surrounding delegation: "The purpose of the
nondelegation doctrine is twofold: to ensure that basic policy
choices will be made by duly authorized and politically responsible
officials and to protect citizens against arbitrary and discrimina-
tory action by public officials." 8
The court noted that the nondelegation doctrine "stems" from
the character of the Rhode Island Constitution as the supreme law
of the state and as assigning the legislative power to the legislative
branch.59 Interestingly, therefore, the nondelegation doctrine is
another example of an implied limit on plenary legislative power,
inherent in the concept of legislative power. A doctrine prohibiting
reverse delegation can also be seen as inherent in the concept of
legislative power.
56. Greco, supra note 54, at 588.
57. "Category II states shift more power to administrative agencies to deter-
mine policy." Id.
58. Bourque, 589 A.2d at 817 (citing Davis v. Wood, 427 A.2d 332, 335 (R.I.
1981)).
59. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
There are many occasions on which state courts look to the
concept of legislative (and executive) power to derive implied limits
on plenary state legislative authority. The issue of legislative
membership on, and appointment to, executive branch boards calls
for a similar approach. The Rhode Island Supreme Court should
seriously consider a bright-line, administrable rule prohibiting leg-
islators and their appointees from serving on executive boards,
thereby ending the practice of reverse delegation. Looked at either
formally (concept of legislative power) or functionally (encroach-
ment), this is a case for judicial intervention. It is time to get the
legislative "fox" out of the executive "hen-house."60
60. Cf. Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n), 612 A.2d 1, 11
(R.I. 1992) (analyzing the reach of the Ethics Commission's powers, and noting the
concern that if ethics were left to the legislature "'the sharp teeth in any code of
ethics could be removed by those who feared being bitten'" (quoting the proponents
of the commission)). Here, one might say that if execution of the law is left to
legislators and their appointees, the sharp teeth of legislative oversight can be re-
moved by those who fear being bitten.
